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Introduction 
The objective of the EFrame FFI project was to develop a structured framework for traffic safety 
evaluation in an industrial (commercial vehicle manufacturer) context. The resulting framework 
facilitates more efficient development of crash/injury countermeasures by identifying and focusing 
on the most important safety (crash) problems, providing a toolset for analyzing crashes and 
estimating the potential and actual effectiveness of safety systems and services and, finally, 
identifying the data sources needed to perform these analyses. A general overview of the project and 
its results can be found in the Final Report (Engström and Wege, 2016) 
The project started with identification of the general types of safety evaluation needed from an 
industrial development perspective (the Evaluation Use Cases, EUCs). The EUCs helped to keep the 
project focused, in spite of its broad general scope, and constituted the basis for all remaining work 
in the project. The following EUCs were defined: 
EUC 1a: Following up the safety performance of Volvo Group trucks over time: The key goal of this 
type of evaluation is to be able to follow up the safety performance of Volvo’s products already on 
the market (i.e., retrospective analysis). A specific example would be to compare the general safety 
performance (e.g., the risk for occupant injury) in Volvo trucks compared to competitors. Another 
would be to estimate the retrospective safety benefits of new safety features (e.g., the reduced crash 
risk offered by Advanced Emergency Braking, AEB)   
EUC 1b: Understand which safety system or service has the highest potential benefit for heavy goods 
vehicles on specific markets: The main goal here is to be able to identify the key safety problems 
relevant for Volvo products on a specific market using available safety data for (e.g., national crash 
statistics), and use this analysis to identify which safety features offer the highest potential safety 
benefits on that market. 
EUC 2: Definition of target scenarios and use cases for passive and active safety systems (as a basis 
for functional requirements): The aim here is to clearly identify and define the problems (injuries, 
crashes and their contributing factors) that safety systems and services are supposed to address (i.e., 
target scenarios defining crash statistics and crash/injury causation mechanisms), and to specify how 
the crash scenarios should be addressed (i.e., use case: how crashes and/or injuries are intended to 
be prevented by the safety system/service). This analysis should then form the basis for functional 
requirement specification in system development as well as the starting point for predictive 
(prospective) safety/cost benefit evaluation (EUC3). 
 
EUC 3: Predictive (prospective) safety/cost benefit assessment: The aim of this type of analysis is to 
predict safety and/or cost benefits (e.g., crash reduction potential) of products and services not yet 
on the market as a key input to product planning.  
EUC 4: Iterative evaluation during development: This represents the need to evaluate a 
system/service effectiveness during development, for example, in order to select between candidate 
system designs or to tune parameters (e.g., in a warning algorithm). 
EUC 5: Evaluating the safety performance of a customer fleet or specific systems/services: The aim 
here is to be able to evaluate the safety performance of a customer fleet (e.g., in terms of crash rate 
3 
 
or in terms of costs) and the potential for specific improvements (for the customer, e.g., in terms 
crash and associated cost reductions) offered by safety systems and services. This should also 
account for non-traffic crashes (e.g. at a customer site or in a closed logistical area like goods 
distribution at harbors). 
Figure 1 maps the EFrame Evaluation Use Cases to the general Volvo safety development process 
(the “circle of life”).  
 
Figure 1 Illustration of the EFrame EUCs within the general Volvo safety development process (the “circle of life”) 
 
Based on the Evaluation Use Cases, an initial sketch of the evaluation framework was developed in 
WP1. This was followed by a comprehensive state-of-the-art review of existing data sources and road 
safety analysis methodologies that could potentially be used as components in the framework (WP2). 
Based on this, existing methods were adapted, or novel methods developed, to address the 
Evaluation Use Cases (WP3). Finally, the methods adapted/developed in WP3 were applied to a set of 
concrete evaluation test cases in order to demonstrate the framework and identify needs for further 
improvement (WP4). Based on this, the final framework was defined. The objective of the present 
report is to describe the final version of the framework.  
The report starts with a general overview of the framework. Next the methodology for defining 
target scenarios and use cases, which can be considered the “heart” of the framework, is outlined. 
This is followed by descriptions of methods for crash- and safety effectiveness analysis respectively. 
Finally, the types of data sources required for supporting the framework are outlined.   
 
Framework overview 
Figure 2 provides a high-level illustration of the evaluation framework and its four general 
components. Data sources refer to all sources of data (e.g., crash, behavior, exposure) that is needed 
to address the evaluation use cases. Analysis refers to the extraction of different types of information 
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from the data. This may, for example, involve high-level analysis of crash statistics, detailed 
investigation of crash and/or injury causation mechanisms or the investigation of safety problems at 
a specific customer. The analysis result can sometimes be an independent output in its own right, but 
is generally conducted with the goal to define target scenarios and use cases.  
The definition of target scenarios and use cases can be seen as the heart of the framework and is 
proposed to underlie all future safety feature development and evaluation at Volvo. Target scenarios 
refer to definitions of the problems that safety features are supposed to address (e.g., injuries, 
crashes or certain behaviors leading to crashes) and use cases describe how these problems are 
supposed to be addressed by safety features. The use cases should then serve as input to the 
specification of functional requirement at the beginning of the development process, but also as the 
basis for effectiveness analysis. Effectiveness analysis here refers to the prospective or retrospective 
analysis of the (potential or actual) effectiveness of different safety systems or services, for example, 
in terms of the proportion of target crashes prevented. This may involve counterfactual (”what-if”) 
simulation for re-playing the target scenarios with an active safety function and/or analytic methods 
(e.g., dose-response functions) for estimating potential reductions in injury risk. Finally, the results 
from the effectiveness evaluation can be scaled up to national crash statistics to obtain estimates of 
safety benefits on the national scale (e.g., number or severe injuries prevented per year). The results 
from the effectiveness analysis are envisioned as a key input to prioritization between safety 
features, for example in product planning.  
The framework can thus be regarded as a toolbox for safety evaluation at Volvo, but also as a guide 
for how to use the data sources and analysis tools in a structured and efficient way. In the following 
sections, the framework components (tools and data sources) are described in further detail, with 
pointers to the project reports providing more detailed descriptions. We will begin with the 
definition of target scenarios and use cases as this is the “heart” of the framework, as the main target 
for crash analysis and the starting point for effectiveness analysis.  
5 
 
 
Figure 2 High-level representation of the safety evaluation framework 
 
Definition of target scenarios and use cases 
As stated above, the definition of target scenarios and use cases is intended as the logical starting 
point for any safety development and evaluation at Volvo. The general intended role of target 
scenarios and use cases in safety system development is schematically illustrated in Figure 3.  
When envisioning a new safety feature, it is critical to be clear about the safety problem that the 
feature is supposed to address, that is, the target scenario. The definition of the target scenario 
should thus be based on available data and knowledge on, for example, the prevalence of crash types 
and their underlying causal mechanisms. Based on this, the next step is to define precisely how the 
safety feature is intended to address the safety problem (the use case). Here, it is also critical to 
consider enabling technologies and legal requirements which may impose further constraints on the 
possibilities to realize the use case. The use cases then provide the starting point for technological 
development (in terms of functional requirements), all testing activities as well as (prospective and 
retrospective) effectiveness evaluation. The present methodology for target scenario and use case 
development was based on the method previously developed in the InteractIVe EU-funded project 
(Engström, 2010a, b). See also the relevant state-of-the-art review performed within the present 
project (Engström, 2014). 
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Figure 3 Schematic illustration of the general role of target scenarios and use cases in safety feature development and 
evaluation 
 
While the principles outlined in Figure 3 are adhered to within AB Volvo (and probably most other 
vehicle manufacturers) in a general sense, what is proposed here is a more structured way of 
working based on clear cut definitions of target safety problems and solutions as the basis for 
development, ensuring (1) that development of safety features focuses on real safety problems and 
(2), that the proposed solutions are effective in addressing these problems.   
The general proposed logic for defining target scenarios and use cases is illustrated in Figure 4 (this 
represents a slightly modified version compared to the original scheme proposed in the Task 3.4 
report; Engström, Piccinini and Törnvall, 2015). At the highest level, each target scenario and use 
case is associated with a general crash type, which corresponds to the general crash typologies found 
in national crash databases, or in the Volvo ART Report (e.g., rear-end, run-off-road etc.). Target 
scenarios are then defined separately for the three main crash development phases: (1) crash, (2) 
conflict and (3) non-conflict, using pre-defined templates.  For a further definition of these three 
phases, see (Engström, Piccinini and Törnvall, 2015). 
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Figure 4 General logic behind target scenario and use case definition 
 
The Level 1 target scenarios represent high-level crash types, within the general crash type (e.g. , 
rear-end & lead vehicle stationary). Level 1 target scenarios are typically derived from national crash 
data (e.g., STRADA in Sweden or NASS-GES in the US) or statistically representative in-depth crash 
data (e.g., GIDAS). An example of a Level 1 target scenario specification for the conflict phase is given 
in Figure 5 (adopted from the Task 4.3 report, Engström, Bärgman and Lodin, 2016). 
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Figure 5 Example of a Level 1 target scenario for the conflict phase 
 
Each Level 1 target scenario may be associated with several Level 2 target scenarios. The Level 2 
target scenarios define specific causal mechanisms behind the general crashes and/or injuries 
defined at Level 1. This is typically based on in-depth crash/injury data for the crash phase, 
naturalistic crash analysis for the conflict phase and naturalistic driving behavior analysis for the non-
conflict phase. Examples of Level 2 target scenarios for the crash, conflict and non-conflict phases are 
shown in Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8. As is seen in these examples, the Level 2 target scenarios 
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are defined in terms of narratives describing causal mechanisms, although the exact formats (defined 
by the templates) differ between the three phases. For the crash phase, the focus is on injury 
mechanisms, for the conflict phase on crash causation mechanisms and for the non-conflict phase 
more distal (e.g., behavioral or organizational) causes for crashes. The narratives may be 
complemented by other types of representations (e.g., sketches and interaction diagrams; see e.g. 
Engström et al., 2010a) but, to keep things as simple as possible, it was agreed to use the narrative 
format as the basis for Level 2 descriptions in the present framework.  
 
 
Figure 6 Example of a Level 2 scenario for the crash phase (from the Task 4.4 report; Thorn, Törnvall and Thomson, 
2016) 
 
 
Figure 7 Example of Level 2 target scenario for the conflict phase (from the Task 4.3 report; Engström, Bärgman and 
Lodin, 2016) 
 
TSCr1.1.3 (48%): Non-intrusion based injury mechanisms
A heavy duty truck collides with the front in a small angle, 0–±30°
towards another vehicle or an obstacle. The impact is covering the driver 
area but without large intrusions into cab in front of driver. This causes 
deceleration of the driver who moves forward until the seat belt couples 
the driver to the seat (if belted). The forward motion of the driver causes 
contact between the steering wheel and the chest of the driver. The 
chest will be compressed and thereby be exposed to an injury risk.
TSCr1.1.4 (13%): Intrusion based injury 
mechanisms
A heavy duty truck collides with the front in a small 
angle, 0–±30° towards another vehicle or an 
obstacle. The impact is covering the driver area with 
significant intrusions into cab in front of driver.
The intrusions causes deformation of the windscreen 
member which pushes the steering wheel towards 
the driver. The driver moves forward until the seat 
belt couples t e driver to the seat (if belted). The 
forward motion of the driver in combination of the 
steering wheel moving towards the driver causes 
contact between the steering wheel and the chest of 
the driver. Thus, the chest will be compressed and 
thereby be exposed to an injury risk.
The intrusions causes also deformation of footwell
area and knee area in front of instrument panel, 
moving the body-in-white and interior parts towards 
the driver’s lower extremities. The lower extremities 
will be loaded and thereby exposed on an injury risk.
Use case 1: rotating 
steering column
The airbag SRS system 
recieves information of frontal 
crash and triggers the 
steering wheel to a rotation 
downwards and thus in 
combination with airbag 
distributes the loads to the 
chest area.
Use case 2: boron steel floor and 
windscreen members
Decrease the intrusion of windscreen 
member and floor/footwell area by 
high-strength steel members.
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Figure 8 Example of Level 2 target scenario for the non-conflict phase (from the Task 3.4 report; Engström, Piccinini 
and Törnvall, 2015) 
 
As explained above, the use cases define how certain safety features are intended to address the 
safety problems defined by the target scenarios. In the present framework, each use case is 
associated with one or more Level 2 target scenarios (see Figure 4). In the crash phase, relevant 
safety features typically include passive (injury-preventing, protective) features such as restraint 
systems and protective vehicle structures. Use cases for the conflict phase typically involve active 
safety systems such as collision warnings or automatic braking/steering. Finally, safety features 
operating in the non-conflict phase may involve driving support systems operating in non-conflict 
situations such as Adaptive Cruise Control or Driver Alert Systems, but also behavior-based safety 
services such as driver coaching and more general safety management services. Examples of use 
cases for the three phases are given in Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
 
Figure 9 Examples of use cases for the crash phase and their associated target scenarios (from Thorn, Törnvall and 
Thomson, 2016) 
TSCr1.1.3 (48%): Non-intrusion based injury mechanisms
A heavy duty truck collides with the front in a small angle, 0–±30°
towards another vehicle or an obstacle. The impact is covering the driver 
area but without large intrusions into cab in front of driver. This causes 
deceleration of the driver who moves forward until the seat belt couples 
the driver to the seat (if belted). The forward motion of the driver causes 
contact between the steering wheel and the chest of the driver. The 
chest will be compressed and thereby be exposed to an injury risk.
TSCr1.1.4 (13%): Intrusion based injury 
mechanisms
A heavy duty truck collides with the front in a small 
angle, 0–±30° towards another vehicle or an 
obstacle. The impact is covering the driver area with 
significant intrusions into cab in front of driver.
The intrusions causes deformation of the windscreen 
member which pushes the steering wheel towards 
the driver. The driver moves forward until the seat 
belt couples the driver to the seat (if belted). The 
forward motion of the driver in combination of the 
steering wheel moving towards the driver causes 
contact between the steering wheel and the chest of 
the driver. Thus, the chest will be compressed and 
thereby be exposed to an injury risk.
The intrusions causes also deformation of footwell
area and knee area in front of instrument panel, 
moving the body-in-white and interior parts towards 
the driver’s lower extremities. The lower extremities 
will be loaded and thereby exposed on an injury risk.
Use case 1: rotating 
steering column
The airbag SRS system 
recieves information of frontal 
crash and triggers the 
steering wheel to a rotation 
downwards and thus in 
combination with airbag 
distributes the loads to the 
chest area.
Use case 2: boron steel floor and 
windscreen members
Decrease the intrusion of windscreen 
member and floor/footwell area by 
high-strength steel members.
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Figure 10 Example of a use case for the conflict phase: Advanced Emergency Braking System with Forward Collision 
Warning addressing the target scenario in Figure 7 (from Engström, Bärgman and Lodin, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 11 Example use case for the non-conflict phase: Behavior Change Management Program addressing the 
tailgating target scenario in Figure 8 (from Engström, Piccinini and Törnvall, 2015) 
 
While the three use cases exemplified in Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11 address quite different 
problems (occupant injuries, late reactions due to driver distraction and tailgating respectively) and 
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by different means (protective vehicle structures, warnings/automatic braking and behavior change 
management), the general way of working is based on the same basic logic: The proposed solutions 
defined by the use cases are based on detailed definitions of the problems to be solved (the target 
scenarios), in turn supported by various forms of crash analysis (as further discussed in the following 
section). 
 
Analysis methods 
“Analysis” in the present framework refers to all types of information extraction from data, including, 
for example, analysis of crash statistics, crash/injury causation analysis, risk estimation but also the 
more general analyses of safety problem at specific customers. As stated above, the main goal of the 
analysis efforts within the present framework is to support the definition of target scenarios. 
In the beginning of the project a comprehensive state-of-the-art review was performed on existing 
analysis methods and data sources that could potentially be used to realize the Eframe Evaluation 
Use Cases. This was documented in a set of review reports, listed in Table 1 (the review reports 
related to data sources are listed below). 
 
Table 1 List of state-of-the-art review reports on existing analysis methods 
Document name Author 
EFrame_WP2_SoA review_General_crash_statistics_analysis András Bálint (Chalmers) 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_Risk_analysis Johan Engström (Volvo) 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_ ACCM (Analysis of Crash Contributing 
Mechanisms) 
Jonas Bärgman (Chalmers) 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_ Experimental analysis Giulio Piccinini (Chalmers) 
 
Based on the state-of-the-art review, a subset of analysis methods were identified and adapted to 
the present framework. In addition, some methods have been developed more or less from scratch. 
This section provides an overview of these methods with references to the relevant task reports 
containing more detailed information. 
 
Identifying Level 1 target scenarios from statistical crash data 
As explained above, the role of the Level 1 target scenario representation is to define general crash 
types and their statistical properties. Perhaps the simplest way to do this is to use pre-defined crash 
typologies in national crash databases such as STRADA (Sweden) or NASS-GES (USA). It is also 
possible to define new categories by selecting a subset of key defining variables in the database 
(usually those used to define crash kinematics), and chose the variable combinations that account for 
most cases (see Engström et al., 2015). These categories can then be further compared with respect 
to other variables such as weather or driver state. In many cases, such analyses already exist in the 
literature which can be used for present purposes. This approach was used to define Level 1 target 
scenarios in Task 4.3 in the present project. Here, an existing analysis of rear end crashes using NASS-
GES data (plus some other US crash data sources) by Woodrooffe et al. (2012) was re-used and 
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adapted to present purposes by re-categorizing the original crash categories into the present Level 1 
target scenario categories (Engström, Bärgman and Lodin, 2016). This is illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12 Illustration of the definition of Level 1 target scenarios (for rear-end crashes) and associated statistics based 
on an existing analysis in the literature (see the T4.3 report, Engström, Bärgman and Lodin for details) 
 
An alternative approach is to use a more data driven analysis to find relevant pattern in statistical 
crash data. This may be particularly useful for identifying key safety problems on a certain market 
(EUC1b; e.g., which combinations of factors are most predictive of severe injuries), which could serve 
as the basis for Level 1 target scenario specification in the next step. Recently, there has been an 
increased interest in applying statistical methods generally known as recursive trees in the context of 
road safety analysis, and this approach was also investigated in the present project. Specifically, a 
combination of random forest and random trees were applied on STRADA data (see the Task 4.2 
report; Pirnia, 2016). The general methodology is outlined in Figure 13 (adopted from Pirnia, 2016).  
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Figure 13 General statistical methodology, based on recursive trees, for identifying key safety problems in statistical 
crash data (from Pirnia, 2016). 
 
An example of the output from this type of analysis on STRADA data, with crash severity as the target 
variable, is illustrated in Figure 14 (from Pirnia, 2016). It can be observed that the variable 
combination with the highest fatality probability is collisions between motor vehicles and pedestrians 
in non-urban areas. However, these crashes are very rare, accounting only for 1% of the data. By 
contrast, rear-end crashes on smaller roads (with speed limit < 110 kph) is the most common variable 
combination. However, in this case the zero fatality probability is close to zero. 
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Figure 14 Example results from recursive tree analysis of STRADA data (from Pirnia, 2016) 
 
Defining Level 2 target scenarios based on detailed crash/pre-crash  
As described above, Level 2 target scenarios should represent the detailed causal mechanisms 
behind injuries and crashes. This generally requires analyses of more detailed crash data, in particular 
in-depth and naturalistic crash data. In-depth crash data typically include crash reconstructions, 
associated injury records and subjective pre-crash data based on driver interviews (e.g., the GIDAS, 
ETAC and INTACT databases). Naturalistic crash data typically include video of the forward roadway 
and the driver, as well as some (often limited) kinematic data (e.g., speed and acceleration). While 
both types of data is potentially relevant for understanding crash/injury causation mechanisms in 
both the crash and conflict phases, in-depth crash data is here viewed as the main source of input for 
the crash phase while naturalistic crash data is considered the main data source for the conflict 
phase. 
There are several ways in which in-depth crash/injury data could be analyzed to derive injury 
causation mechanisms. One approach, employed in the present project (Thorn et al., 2016; Task 4.4), 
is to use decision trees similar to the random trees outlined above for Level 1 target scenarios. 
However, in this case, the decision tree was developed top-down by means of expert-based analysis 
rather than in the data-driven (bottom-up) way described above. The results from an analysis of 
injuries resulting from frontal collisions (based on the ETAC in-depth database) is illustrated in Figure 
15 (see the Task 4.4 report, Thorn et al., 2016, for details). 
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Figure 15 Analysis of injury causation mechanisms based on decision tree analysis. This analysis was the basis for the 
crash phase target scenarios and use cases shown in Figure ### above. See Thorn et al., (2016) for details. 
 
For the analysis of crash causation mechanisms for (conflict phase) Level 2 target scenarios, a novel 
method was developed, partly within the present project. The method, named CANDE (Causation 
Analysis for Naturalistic Driving Events) is an expert-based method for identifying causal factors 
behind crashes (and near crashes) based on naturalistic crash data. It is based on previous 
developments within the ANNEXT project (Engström, Werneke, Bärgman, Nguyen and Cook, 2013) 
and is still in under development. The key idea is to first characterize the conflict itself and how it was 
induced. In the next step, the driver’s corrective action to the conflict (or the lack thereof) is 
analyzed. The results from the analysis of individual crashes can then be superimposed in order to 
elucidate general causation patterns which can be used as the basis for defining Level 2 target 
scenarios. An example of such an analysis is shown in Figure 16. The causation pattern represented 
by these 10 aggregated crashes (“impaired reaction due to eyes-off-road while following” ) was 
identified as the most common mechanism behind truck/bus rear-end crashes in the Lytx naturalistic 
crash dataset used for this analysis.  
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Figure 16 CANDE analysis for ten crashes representing the “Impaired reaction due to eyes-off-road while following” 
Level 2 target scenario. This analysis was the basis for the conflict-phase target scenario shown in Figure ### above 
(see Engström et al., 2016 for further details). 
 
Customer safety analysis 
The safety analysis methods described so far may, in principle, also be applied to the safety analysis 
at a specific customer. However, when conducting safety analysis at the customer level, several 
additional constraints apply. First, the crash data typically available from a single customer is 
generally limited, both in terms of the number of recorded crashes and the level of detail at which 
the crashes (and their causes) are described. Second, the majority of the crashes occurring in a fleet 
are relatively non-severe and often occurring outside road traffic (i.e. in work yards etc.). Hence, 
these crashes do not appear in traditional crash databases but may still result in significant costs and 
are thus of key relevance for the customer. On the other hand, when performing a safety analysis for 
a customer fleet, it may be possible to extract information not readily available in “traditional” crash 
data (for example, information a bad safety culture, reflected in unsafe driving habits or 
inappropriate vehicle maintenance, which may be addressed by Volvo safety services.  
Thus, in order to support safety analysis at the customer level, a set of additional analysis methods 
were developed within the present project, as further described in the Task 3.3 report (Wege and 
Pirnia, 2016). First, a general methodology for customer safety investigation was developed with the 
purpose to identify safety issues and their associated costs. Second, a crash coding scheme was 
developed specifically for non-traffic crashes (documented in the Task 3.3.3 report; Pirnia, 2015). 
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Effectiveness estimation 
Effectiveness estimation can be roughly divided into prospective and retrospective analysis. The goal 
of prospective analysis is to estimate the potential effectiveness of a safety feature (e.g., in terms of 
prevented crashes and/or injuries) before it is put on the market (e.g., in the early stages of 
development). This is of key importance for the prioritization of safety features in product 
development. By contrast, retrospective effectiveness estimation refers to the follow up of the actual 
effectiveness of safety features already on the market. By using the statistics defined for the Level 1 
target scenarios, the effectiveness estimates for specific Level 2 target scenarios may be scaled up, 
yielding general safety benefits on the national/regional level. 
Both prospective and retrospective effectiveness estimation were addressed in EFrame, as further 
outlined below. Moreover, a method for scaling up to the national level was developed and 
demonstrated for the conflict phase (Task 4.3). 
 
Prospective effectiveness estimation 
Crash phase  
A general method for prospective effectiveness estimation of injury reduction for the crash phase is 
outlined in the Task 4.4 report (Thorn et al., 2016). The general methodology, first developed in Task 
3.5 (Piccinini et al., 2015) is illustrated in Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17 General flow chart for prospective effectiveness analysis for the crash phase (from Thorn et al., 2016) 
 
19 
 
As shown in Figure 17, the effectiveness estimation starts from the target scenario and use case 
definition. The first step is to derive a relationship between a crash impact measure (e.g., impact 
speed) and the risk for an injury above a certain level (say AIS2+) based on in-depth crash data (in 
this case the ETAC database). This results in an injury risk curve for the target scenario in question. 
Next, the exposure to different levels of crash impact (the dose) is derived from in-depth crash data. 
Multiplying the exposure with the injury risk curve yields the response curve representing the 
number of injured drivers (obtain by integrating the response curve). Finally, the general expected 
effect of passive safety systems is to shift the injury risk curve so that given impact results in a lower 
injury risk. The expected shift in injury risk for a specific countermeasure may be obtained through 
physical tests, crash simulations, expert judgments or combinations of those. Shifting the injury risk 
curve thus results in a new response curve (a lower number of injured people). This reduction thus 
represents the effectiveness of the feature for the use case in question. The method is further 
illustrated in Figure 18 and described in further detail in Thorn et al. (2016; see also the state-of-the-
art review of risk analysis methods in Engström, 2014b). 
If the statistical prevalence of the corresponding target scenario, the effectiveness estimate can be 
scaled up to safety benefits at the national level (e.g. , the number of AIS2+ injuries prevented per 
year in a country). However, this step was not performed in Task 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 18 Example of AIS2+ injury prevention effectiveness estimation for two crash phase (passive safety) use cases 
(from Thorn et al., 2016).  
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Conflict phase  
The general methodology for prospective effectiveness estimation for the conflict phase (active 
safety functions) is illustrated in Figure 19 (from Piccinini et al., 2015). The general logic is very similar 
to the corresponding process for the crash phase (Figure 17). However, while the crash phase 
analysis is mainly based on analytic dose-response functions, but effectiveness analysis for the 
conflict phase is based on counterfactual (what-if) simulation.  
 
 
 
Figure 19 General flow chart for prospective effectiveness analysis for the conflict phase (from Piccinini et al., 2015) 
 
The analysis starts from the target scenarios and use cases. Figure 20 shows an example of a target 
scenario hierarchy resulting from crash analysis. The general idea is then to recreate the Level 2 
target scenarios in simulation along with models of the system functionality (as defined by the use 
case), the environment and the driver (Piccinini et al, 2015). The system effectiveness can then be 
calculated for each Level 2 scenario, for example, in terms of the proportion of prevented crashes. 
Methods for reconstructing scenario kinematics from naturalistic crash (Lytx) data have been 
developed in previous projects (e.g., Bärgman et al., 2013) but were further refined in the present 
project (see Engström, Bärgman and Lodin, 2016). 
There are several different ways in which this process may be implemented in practice. In particular, 
this concerns how the individual crash scenarios (representing the Level 2 target scenarios) are 
generated for the simulation. One approach is to run the simulation on actual reconstructed 
naturalistic crashes in the dataset. Alternatively, one can use a Monte Carlo simulation approach 
where synthetic cases are generated based on kinematic distributions representing derived from the 
crash data (one could also envision several possibilities “in between”, e.g., generating different 
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synthetic variants of each actual crash). Due to the limited amount of available crash data, the latter 
approach was adopted for the demonstration application in Task 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 20 Example of a target scenario hierarchy for rear end conflicts (from the Task 4.3 report; Engström et al., 
2016)  
 
In Task 4.3, the method outlined above was applied to effectiveness estimation for an Advanced 
Emergency Braking (AEB) system, including Forward Collision Warning (FCW). Some results from the 
simulation are shown in Figure 21. The left panel shows the estimated percentage prevented crashes 
for four of the rear-end Level 2 target scenarios shown in Figure 20. Results are presented for AEB 
and FCW alone and in combination. In Figure 21, it can, for example, be observed that FCW reached 
about 50% crash prevention rate in the first target scenario (the ““impaired reaction due to eyes-off-
road while following” target scenario exemplified in Figure 7and Figure 16 above). It can also be 
observed that AEB reached almost 100% crash prevention rate in all target scenarios. As discussed in 
the Task 4.3 report (Engström et al., 2016), this is probably due to assumptions of a perfectly working 
AEB system, thus not accounting for sensory limitations or adverse operating conditions. The right 
panel in Figure 21 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis, investigating how the crash prevention 
rate is affected if the AEB system obtains less actual deceleration than it requires (e.g., due to 
slippery road conditions or badly maintained brakes). As shown, if the actual deceleration is 20% less 
than requested by the AEB, the prevention rate drops below 50% in both scenarios (for AEB alone). 
This further illustrates how this type of counterfactual simulation can be used during development to 
investigate how effectiveness (e.g., crash prevention rate) is affected by different system parameter 
settings (i.e., EUC4, virtual prototyping). It should be emphasized that, due to the limited amount of 
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data available, these results from the T4.3 effectiveness analysis should not be taken at face value. 
Rather, the goal here was only to demonstrate the method. 
 
 
Figure 21 Results from the effectiveness analysis in Task 4.3 (from Engström et al., 2016) 
 
The demonstration application in Task 4.3 also involved scaling up to US national statistics via the 
Level 1 target scenarios. This involved two major challenges. First, since the Level 2 target scenarios 
were defined based on naturalistic crashes, their relative prevalence had to be estimated based on 
the naturalistic data. Of course, the 30 Lytx crashes used in this demonstration cannot be considered 
statistically representative. However, the problem more fundamental since scaling up (in the present 
methodology) always has to rely on the naturalistic data (since Level 2 target scenarios never can be 
fully identified in police-reported crash data). At the same time, the counterfactual simulation 
methodology employed here simply cannot be performed based on statistical crash data only (since 
detailed information from the pre-crash phase is lacking). With larger naturalistic crash datasets, it 
seems likely that this representativity issue can be addressed by weighting factors in a similar way as 
for GIDAS today. Another approach, currently investigated in the QUADRAE FFI project, is to match 
target scenarios established in naturalistic data to in-depth (GIDAS) data, which may be used as an 
intermediate step before mapping to national statistics. 
While the methodology for passive safety system (crash phase) effectiveness estimation (presented 
in the previous section and in Thorn et al., 2016) is relatively mature, the present simulation-based 
methodology for active safety systems (conflict phase) was more or less developed from scratch in 
the project. Thus, it clearly needs further development before being employed in actual development 
at Volvo. Further development of the method is currently undertaken in the QUADRAE project, in 
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collaboration with Volvo Cars and Autoliv. A first goal there is to implement the same type of 
effectiveness estimation for AEBS demonstrated in the present project, but with more mature 
simulation tools (Prescan). In this way, the present approach for effectiveness estimation can be 
integrated with existing simulation tools for technical testing (e.g., models of imperfect sensors), thus 
yielding more accurate effectiveness estimates. 
 
Retrospective effectiveness estimation 
The project also addressed methods for following up the safety performance of Volvo products 
already on the market. This could involve comparisons between Volvo trucks and competitor brands 
with respect to the risk of crash involvement or occupant injury, or comparison between Volvo trucks 
with and without a certain safety feature.  
The general goal with this type of analysis is thus to calculate estimates of risk, which calls on 
methods from the field of epidemiology (see the state-of-the-art review on risk analysis (Engström, 
2014b) for an overview). Generally, risk estimation involves relating a road safety outcome measure 
(e.g., the number of injured occupants) to a measure of exposure (e.g., kilometers travelled); see 
Bálint, 2016; Bálint and Pirnia, 2015). 
A general flow chart was developed for this type of analysis, shown in Figure 22. As can be seen, the 
methodology includes different options depending on the data available. If exposure data is available 
for each target category (in this case vehicle brand), the risk ratio can be directly estimated. If 
exposure data is not available, relative risk can still be estimated by means of induced exposure (see 
Bálint, 2016; Bálint and Pirnia, 2015; Engström, 2014b) if there are crashes that can be assumed to be 
unrelated to the target category (so-called comparison crashes or control crashes). 
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Figure 22 General flowchart for retrospective analysis of safety performance/effectiveness (from Bálint, 2016) 
 
The demonstration application in T4.1 (Balint, 2016) was based on US national statistics (NASS-GES 
data. Due to the lack of information on whether the involved vehicles were equipped with safety 
systems the NASS-GES crash data, the demonstration focused on comparing US Volvo Group heavy 
trucks (>11.8 tons; Vehicle class 7-8; Volvo and Mack) to competitor trucks of the same class. In this 
demonstration, the risk ratio was estimated directly using US market share as the exposure measure. 
The exposure (market share) information was obtained from the online statistics portal Statista 
(see the Task 3.2 report, Bálint & Pirnia, 2015, for a further discussion on exposure data relevant for 
this application and Fagerlind, 2014, for a general review of existing exposure data). 
Figure 23 shows an example of the results, where the relative risk of crash involvement (in crashes of 
all severities) is plotted for competitors in comparison to Volvo Group trucks.  
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Figure 23 Risk of involvement in crashes of all severities by market share in the US for Volvo Group trucks, relative 
to competitors. Values above 0 indicate that Volvo Group trucks are more involved in crashes, while values below 0 
indicate that Volvo Group trucks are less involved in crashes than trucks from the competitors, relative to market 
shares. (from Bálint, 2016) 
 
Differences in safety performance between brands can be due to many reasons unrelated to the 
vehicles themselves, such as correlations between a fleet’s preference for a certain truck brand and 
their company (safety) culture. Thus, while the brand comparisons reported in Bálint (2016) are 
interesting, the method is probably most useful for more specific comparisons relating to 
retrospective analysis of safety system effectiveness, similar to the work by Lie et al (2006) on safety 
benefits estimation of Electronic Stability Control (ESC). However, this requires information in the 
crash data on whether the involved vehicles were equipped with the safety system in question. 
While this is not part of the standard crash coding in most national statistical databases, it may be 
possible to obtain this information via the registration and chassis numbers (at least for Volvo 
trucks). Since exposure data is unlikely to be available for equipped vs. non-equipped trucks, the 
induced exposure method seems best suited in this case. A collaborative effort on retrospective 
effectiveness analysis of AEBS has recently been initiated between Volvo and the Swedish Transport 
Administration, and the methods developed in the present project could serve as one starting point 
for this type of analysis. 
 
Data sources 
As outlined in the previous sections, the analyses required to derive target scenarios relies primarily 
on three types of crash data: (1) National/regional crash statistics, (2) in-depth crash data and (3) 
naturalistic driving data. In addition, as outlined in the previous section, other types of data are 
needed as input to effectiveness analyses, for example exposure data for risk analysis.   
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In this section, the requirements and availability of such data is briefly discussed. For more extensive 
discussion on data needs see the Task 4.3 and Task 4.4 reports (Engström et al., 2016; Thorn et al., 
2016). For more extensive reviews of available data, see the state-of-the-art reports addressing data 
sources (listed in Table 2).  
Table 2 State-of-the-art reports addressing available data sources 
Document name Author 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_Crash_Statistics-Mass_Data Helen Fagerlind & András Bálint 
(Chalmers) 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_In-depth_crash_data Helen Fagerlind & András Bálint 
(Chalmers) 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_Naturalistic_driving_data Giulio Piccinini (Chalmers) 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_ Experimental data Giulio Piccinini (Chalmers) 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_Exposure_data Helen Fagerlind (Chalmers) 
EFrame_WP2_SoA_Societal_data Claudia Wege (Volvo) 
 
National/region crash statistics (mass data) 
As described above, this national/regional crash statistics is mainly needed for the definition of Level 
1 target scenarios, in particular to derive general statistics (e.g., the prevalence of different crash 
types) and identify general traffic safety problems in a region.  
While aggregated crash statistics is available at the international level from several sources (Fagerlind 
and Balint, 2014), more detailed, individual, crash records are needed to conduct the types of 
statistical analyses exemplified above. Such databases exist in most industrialized countries but only 
STRADA (Sweden) and NASS-CDS (USA) are currently available to AB Volvo. Access to other national 
databases typically requires direct contact with the authorities and it is still unclear if the data 
available in national databases other than those used here (e.g., Brazil and China) is sufficient for 
present purposes. For developing countries, this type of data generally does not exist at the required 
level.  
However, some in-depth crash databases may be used as surrogates for national crash statistics, and 
should thus be sufficient to derive Level 1 target scenarios for present purposes. This holds in 
particular for the German GIDAS database which includes weighting factors for the German and 
European crash statistics. It seems possible that the Chinese version of GIDAS (CIDAS) may also be 
used in this way, at least in the future. 
As demonstrated in Task 4.1 (Bálint, 2016), national crash statistics can also be used to follow up the 
safety performance (in terms of changes in crash/injury risk relative to competitors or non-safety-
system-equipped vehicles) of products already on the market. However, this requires that the 
relevant information (vehicle brand, weight class, installed safety systems) is available. However, this 
is only the case for the most advanced databases (such as NASS-GES), and detailed information on 
available safety features is usually not available at all. Thus, additional efforts are probably needed to 
obtain the information needed for retrospective analysis of safety system performance (e.g., by using 
vehicle registration information to get the chassis number, based on which safety system information 
could be obtained internally at Volvo). However, this was not investigated in the present project. 
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In-depth crash data 
In the present framework, in-depth crash data is mainly used as the basis for defining Level 2 target 
scenarios for the crash phase. However, in-depth crash data may potentially also be used to inform 
Level 2 target scenario definition for the conflict phase, although information on pre-crash causal 
mechanisms is usually rather limited. Moreover, as just mentioned, some in-depth data-bases (with 
case weighting factors to national/regional statistics) may be used to define Level 1 scenarios. 
However, as discussed in the Task 4.4 report (Thorn et al., 2016) Volvo’s availability to in-depth crash 
data meeting the EFrame requirements (sufficient number of truck cases, crash reconstruction and 
associated injury data) is currently relatively limited. Existing available databases for the European 
market include INTACT (Sweden) and ETAC (EU). The latter was used for the present analysis in 
WP4.4 (Thorn et al., 2016). However, the number of truck crashes in these databases is still relatively 
limited (26 and 624 respectively). The GIDAS database satisfies all the present requirements and 
contains about 2000 trucks crashes. As mentioned above, GIDAS can also be used to define the Level 
1 target scenarios. However, Volvo does not currently have access to GIDAS and getting access is 
associated with a significant fee. The EFrame methodology clearly shows that investment in GIDAS 
would be a game changer with respect to the types of analyses that could be performed (Volvo Cars 
and Autoliv already has access).   
In the US, detailed in-depth crash data for trucks is publicly available from the Large Truck Crash 
Causation Study (LTCCS), which contains about 1000 truck crashes. However, as noted by Thorn et al. 
(2016), the LTCCS data lacks information on crash severity (e.g. delta-V or Energy Equivalent Speed). 
 
Naturalistic driving data 
In the present framework, naturalistic crash data is considered the primary data source for defining 
Level 2 target scenarios for the conflict phase (as demonstrated in the Task 4.3 report; Engström et 
al., 2016). Reconstructed naturalistic crash time series are also used input to the counterfactual 
simulation used for effectiveness analysis. Moreover, naturalistic driving data (including “normal 
driving” as well as non-crash events such as near-crashes and incidents) can be regarded a key source 
for defining target scenarios for the non-conflict phase relating to unsafe behaviors (e.g. , tailgating 
as in the target scenario example in Figure 8). However, this was not further pursued the present 
project. 
Naturalistic crash data has only recently become available. For passenger cars, a relatively large 
database of (+1000) naturalistic crashes is available through the major SHRP2 data collection effort in 
the US involving +3000 cars. For trucks, however, larger sets of naturalistic crashes are only available 
through commercial driver coaching service providers such as Lytx and SmartDrive. Through 
collaboration with Lytx, AB Volvo and Chalmers obtained unique access to an initial set of about 130 
rear-end and intersection crashes (plus about 80 near crashes), of which a sub-set of the rear-end 
crashes (involving trucks and buses in the US) were used in the present project (Task 4.3; see 
Engström et al., 2016). AB Volvo, together with Volvo Cars, Chalmers, Virginia Tech Transportation 
Institute and University of Iowa, is currently working towards a more long-term partnership with Lytx 
which will ensure a regular inflow of naturalistic truck crashes, to which Volvo (and the other 
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consortium partners) will have unique access. It is thus foreseen that the amount and quality of 
naturalistic crash data will increase substantially in the coming years. For example, the current 
generation of the Lytx data logger contains video-based sensing technology providing even more 
detailed pre-crash data, for example on lane position and the distance to surrounding objects.   
 
Evaluating the safety performance of a customer fleet 
Accidents are much more expensive than many fleets realize. The cost comprises more than the 
repair cost for the vehicle and often less might be covered by the insurance than assumed. It has 
been estimated that the full cost to the employer might actually be 15 to 75 US dollars for every US 
dollar recovered through an insurance claim (Fleet Forum Fleet Safety Guide, 2013). 
The starting point for saving money is to understand costs. After a collision, vehicle repairs are just 
the tip of the iceberg. An Australian study (Davey, Jeremy and Banks, Tamara D, 2005) estimating the 
cost of motor vehicle incidents in Australia indicated that the total cost of a fleet vehicle insurance 
claim is four to 15 times higher than the average direct repair costs. 
The challenge is that there are a lot of hidden costs of collisions and customers do not systematically 
evaluate the safety problem at their fleet. The general methodology for identifying the existing safety 
problems in a customer fleet (including methods on how to collect fleet management economics, 
fleet operations data and fleet data management (what kind of data, frequency of data collection, 
who follows up?)) was discussed and validated with in-depth interviews with the four main Swedish 
insurance companies (Folksam, IF, Trygg Hansa, and Lansforsäkringar). As a result of the work done in 
WP3 and the interviews conducted in WP4 the Iceberg Model on Accident Related Customer Safety 
Costs (Figure 24) was generated. In the Iceberg Model for accident related customer safety costs 18 
different cost types were identified. Six of these 18 costs are direct customer costs called ”hard 
costs” – these costs are usually not recovered by any insurance company. The costumer directly faces 
these costs, they are visible in their economic books as a net costs. That is why we refer to them as 
“the top” of the iceberg. Underlying the direct costs are numerous hidden costs. 12 hidden cost types 
were identified and divided into either “unrecovered hard costs” (indirect costs) or “soft costs”. The 
first are either vehicle centered costs, driver centered costs, organization centered costs or 
environment centered costs (for more detail on each of these costs see the Figure below). The latter 
soft costs are even more hidden. They are often impossible to measure by a “hard number”, however 
can “hit” the costumer even more than a very high direct hard cost. Examples for soft costs are 
damage to reputation and image including reduced end-customer loyalty, the loss of existing fleet 
drivers or forthcoming difficulty in recruiting new employees (for more detail on each of these costs 
see the Figure below). A further detailed description of the model can be found in Wege and Pirnia 
(2016).  
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Figure 24 Iceberg Model on Accident Related Customer Safety Costs 
 
Today there does not exist a solid methodology for identifying the safety problem at a customer 
fleet. Generally, it is easier to identify the mere number of accidents or even the type of accidents 
(e.g. rear-end damage when backing up at the customer site, see SRM II project for more detail). In 
comparison, it is a challenge to identify causes and consequences (outcomes such as costs) of 
accidents without having a solid accident analysis methodology in place. Within Task 3.3 we propose 
a step-by-step approach for such an analysis. The model that was established is partly based on the 
outcomes of the SRM II project (Löfstrand et al, 2015) and the outcomes of the Value-based-
proposition project (Ali, Favreau, Löfstrand, Strömberg & Söderman, 2012).  
The Iceberg Model was incorporated into a bigger model called “Safety Diagnostic – A Model to 
evaluate the safety performance of a customer fleet” (Figure 25). The model is divided into “long-
term safety investigation of general fleet safety situation” and “short-term investigation on one 
incident/accident” at a fleet. The model covers steps I to VI :  
I. Problem definition (incl. defining a target scenario),  
II. Method 
III. Tool 
IV. Cause (either sharp end or blunt end) and prevalence 
V. Consequence 
VI. Solution (incl. defining a use case) 
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The model is divided into “long-term safety investigation of general fleet safety situation” and “short-
term investigation on one incident/accident” at a fleet. The latter is much more enhanced than going 
out to an accident site shortly after the accident has happened (usually what the Accident Research 
Team ART at Volvo is doing in their daily work). For both types the cause and prevalence of the 
accident needs to be investigated using various methods that are described in the model (e.g. 
obtaining fleet records, observations, interviews). This problem analysis is using an holistic approach 
by identifying also psychological concepts (e.g. identification of staff moral) and organizational 
culture (e.g. safety culture, off-the-job safety or practices of staff screening such as their experience 
or health). 
The consequences of the accident(s) are identified in-depth at the next stage. For the general and 
more long-term safety investigation type this leads directly into the solution stage where solutions 
are proposed (e.g. service offerings). For the short-term accident investigation on one case the next 
step would be a case description of the scenario of the accident. This case description is split into an 
accident reporting (e.g. using the INTACT interview guide or DREAM interview methodology) and a 
cost reporting (e.g. SRM II report; Löfstrand et all, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 25 Customer Safety Analytics Methodology – A Model to evaluate the safety performance of a 
customer fleet 
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Insights from interviews with insurance companies 
 
Within task 3.3 in-depth interviews were conducted with safety specialists from each of the four 
major Swedish transport insurance companies: Folksam, IF , Trygg Hansa, and Lansforsäkringa. The 
outcomes and insights from these interviews were used directly to shape the methodology for the 
customer safety analytics concepts: the long-term and short-term safety investigation methods and 
the Iceberg cost model. 
The transcripts from the interviews are available on request. Data and visual representations of the 
data, such as graphs are available on request. Below is an executive summary of the interview 
results: 
 Most insurance cost are caused by long term payments for disabled people not death 
 Highest cost for brain injuries 
 Third party insurance covers injuries 
 Hospital cost covered by Swedish State 
 50-50 damage to vehicle and material cost 
 A few percent of the claims go to courts with extra costs associated 
 personal damages are more expensive but vehicle damages are more common 
 Most common accident type for trucks in 2014 was hitting standstill object (like poles, rocks 
and etc. but not stand still vehicles) and it accounts for 23% of total number of accidents, 
around 3800/year (source Trygg Hansa) 
 Second most common type of accident was damage to the window glasses which accounts 
for 19% of number of accidents (source Trygg Hansa) 
 Third most common type is hitting parked vehicles, which accounts for 15% of accidents 
(source Trygg Hansa) 
 The above numbers are regarding the number of accidents, but if cost is considered not 
numbers the most costly accidents are accidents will be again hitting standstill objects which 
account for 30% of the costs in 2014 (source Trygg Hansa) 
 Then single accidents, like run off-road accidents are the second most costly with 20% of the 
costs in 2014 (source Trygg Hansa) 
 Driver education and trainings are always welcome as an effect on claim value and royalty of 
customers. Part of driver education should be on usage of safety systems in the trucks in 
order to prevent occasional usage 
In summary, there are a lot of hidden costs of collisions (on road and non-road). Volvo has 
developed a systematic approach on how to analyze the recurrent accident problems as well as 
for a single accident. This helps customers to understand their safety problem and helps Volvo to 
understand the organization. The models that were developed were the Iceberg Model of Safety 
associated costs and a model top evaluate the safety performance of a customer fleet - ”Safety 
Diagnostics Model” as well as a codebook to evaluate non-road accidents. 
Due to difficulties of recruiting a customer fleet on which to test the methods developed in T3.3, 
within the timeframe of the project, the work demonstration of the customer safety analysis 
methods developed in T3.3 could not be conducted. 
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Conclusions 
The present report provided a general overview of the safety evaluation framework developed in 
EFrame with some examples of how it can be used to address different safety evaluation needs 
within AB Volvo (defined here in terms of a set of Evaluation Use Cases).  
For the framework to be used, it is critical that it is adopted by the AB Volvo Accident Research Team 
(ART) and further adapted to the in-house development processes at Volvo. One key issue identified 
in the project was the lack of sufficient in-depth or naturalistic driving data needed to define Level 2 
target scenarios. A virtue of the present framework is that it clearly identifies the data needs for 
different types of analysis, which helps motivating future investments in data, both at Volvo and 
Chalmers. 
In general, further research is needed to apply the framework on specific test cases other than those 
addressed in WP4, but also to further develop some of the specific methods. In particular, this 
concerns methods related to pre-crash causation analysis based on naturalistic crash data (e.g., 
CANDE) and pre-crash simulation methodologies for virtual prototyping (EUC4) and safety benefit 
analysis (EUC3). This is partly addressed in the recently started QUADRAE FFI project which thus can 
be regarded as a key receiver of EFrame results. 
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